In Gandhiji’s own
words Hind Swaraj ‘is a severe condemnation of modern
civilization’1. Gandhiji’s negative opinion
about modern civilization extended to all its aspects. Modern
technology, machine being the fundamental constituting unit of it;
and Western social institutions, particularly those pertaining to
law and medicine, came in for the most severe criticism. The purpose
of this paper is to explore whether a unifying framework exists
within which Gandhiji’s views regarding various aspects of modernity
could be understood.
At one level one
might think of such an exercise as quite superfluous in view of the
facts that on the one hand Gandhiji’s commitment to non-violence was
of a very high order and on the other he saw embodiment of violence
in every feature of modernity. If in the value-system of a person
non-violence figures very high and his characterization of a
particular social order or civilization is such that violence
figures in it in a prominent way then the evaluative judgment of
that social order or civilization being unacceptable follows
immediately; without any recourse to analysis within a complex
framework.
The reason why the
above simple and straightforward way of understanding Gandhian
rejection of modernity will not do is that regardless of how
committed a person might be to a particular value it is
inconceivable that a person would not be subscribing to other
values. Once there is a multiplicity of values, conflicts of values
are almost inevitable.
Gandhiji was not
only committed to non-violence; he was also committed to truth and
other important human values. When two values are in conflict,
willingly or unwillingly, the individual must choose. What holds
true for an individual holds for societies and civilizations as
well. In Gandhiji’s perception Western or modern civilization might
have been more violent than pre-British Indian civilization; but the
question of Gandhiji thinking of Indian civilization prior to
colonization as non-violent does not arise.
Once one
recognizes that in every social order there is bound to be a
multiplicity of values and that it is highly unlikely that any
significant value would be entirely absent from any social order, it
becomes evident that two social orders cannot be meaningfully
compared merely in terms of the presence or absence of this or that
value. Real societies differ not so much with respect to presence or
absence of significant values as they do with respect to the domains
of different values. When different values are in conflict, as
mentioned above, individuals and societies must resolve these
conflicts in some way. One society might accord to a particular
value a large domain of predominance while another society only a
relatively small domain. The meta-principle which determines the
domain and sub-domain of every value is in a fundamental sense the
most important constitutive element of a civilization. It is this
meta-principle which determines what is right and what is wrong.
From Gandhiji’s statement that2
‘Civilization
is that mode of conduct which points out to man the path of duty.’
it appears that
Gandhiji’s intuitive understanding of what a civilization is mainly
about was probably very close to identifying it with the
meta-principle determining the domains and sub-domains of values.
If we abstract
from the other constitutive features of civilizations and
concentrate only on the normative aspects then it is clear that
statements regarding superiority or inferiority of a civilization in
relation to another civilization are really statements proclaiming
superiority or inferiority of the meta-principle embodied in the
former civilization in relation to the meta-principle embodied in
the latter. When a person belongs to or is a product of a particular
civilization then it would be well-nigh impossible for him not to
internalize the meta-principle embodied in that civilization. From
the vantage point of the internalized meta-principle any
civilization with a radically different meta-principle is bound to
be found wanting. Europeans found all non-European civilizations
fundamentally flawed. Although there were major non-Indian
influences on Gandhiji, there can be little doubt that
notwithstanding these influences the cultural-civilizational core of
Gandhiji’s being was derived essentially from the meta-principle
implicit in the Indian society of those days. Someone who had
internalized the normative core of the Indian civilizational
structure was bound to have the kind of judgment that Gandhiji had
regarding the radically different modern civilization.
Although the above
way of looking at normative structure of societies does provide an
understanding of Gandhiji’s critique of modernity, it also
trivializes the critique. Given any two different civilizations any
one of them would turn out to be superior to the other from its own
vantage point. The meaningful comparisons are possible only when
there are objective criteria in terms of which the meta-principles
themselves could be evaluated. It is argued in what follows that in
Gandhiji’s writings, particularly in Hind Swaraj, there are
indications regarding the objective criteria which can be used for
evaluating different social arrangements from normative perspective
under certain conditions, although not in all instances; and that it
is highly likely that while formulating his critique of modernity,
Gandhiji had these objective criteria in mind, although in all
probability only intuitively.
One important
question that one can ask regarding the normative structure of any
society is whether it is sustainable.3 Not every
value-system is self-sustainable. An example may help illustrate the
point. In any society there will be different kinds of institutions
performing a myriad of functions. Successful functioning of social
institutions requires that individuals operating within the
framework of these institutions perform their assigned roles.
Consequently, it is very important that individuals internalize the
idea of performing their assigned roles. In the absence of such
internalization there would emerge a divergence between what is
required of individuals for the proper functioning of the
institution in question and what the individuals would actually do
given their values and preferences. If judges decide cases not on
the basis of law and evidence but in a way which would be most
conducive to their self-interest then there is practically no
possibility of the legal institutions performing as envisaged. Thus,
while it would be foolhardy to expect that individuals will never
behave in selfish ways, it is also clear that if the self-interest
becomes the predominant motive for individual behaviour then in the
long-run many institutions, where performing of assigned roles by
individuals is crucial for their successful functioning, may become
degenerate. Using a somewhat different phraseology, one can say that
the social values which will be realized by societal institutions
depend to a great extent on individual values. While one can expect
that by and large justice will be upheld if judges on the whole
decide cases on the basis of law and evidence; the values which will
be realized through the legal system will have very little
relationship with justice if in the main judges care more about
their self-interest than about justice.
The relationship
between individual values and social values is not a one-way
relationship. As the social values which are realized through the
instrumentality of institutions to a great extent depend on
individual values; so do individual values depend on what social
values are. If certain social values are dominant in the society
they are bound to have profound influence on the formation of
individual values. As both individual and social values impact on
each other the natural and important question arises whether there
is any sustainable equilibrium of these values.
From Gandhiji’s
writings it is abundantly clear that in his opinion the modern
civilization placed the idea of bodily comforts on too high a
pedestal.4 The space that self-interest will
occupy in a system where comforts and luxuries are considered not
only desirable but the highest achievements of civilization is bound
to be rather large. Furthermore, Gandhiji’s intuitive understanding
of major social institutions planted by the British in India was
that they accentuated rather then attenuated the selfish and baser
streaks of human beings. He did not mince words when he spoke of
lawyers and doctors in Hind Swaraj:
‘Whenever
instances of lawyers having done good can be brought forward, it
will be found that the good is due to them as men rather than as
lawyers. All I am concerned with is to show you that the profession
teaches immorality; it is exposed to temptation from which few are
saved.’ (HS, p. 41)
‘The latter’s
duty is to side with their clients and to find out ways and
arguments in favour of the clients to which they (the clients) are
often strangers. If they do not do so they will be considered to
have degraded their profession. The lawyers, therefore, will, as a
rule, advance quarrels instead of repressing them. Moreover, men
take up that profession, not in order to help others out of their
miseries, but to enrich themselves. It is one of the avenues of
becoming wealthy and their interest exists in multiplying disputes.
It is within my knowledge that they are glad when men have disputes.
Petty pleaders actually manufacture them. Their touts, like so many
leeches, suck the blood of the poor people.’ (HS, p. 41)
In the light of
above it seems reasonable to claim that one objective criterion on
which Gandhiji built his criticism of modernity was on the basis of
his intuitive understanding that any normative and institutional
structure which was as hedonistic as the modernity was fundamentally
unsustainable. I think it would not be inappropriate to interpret
the following of his remarks in this sense:
‘Indian
civilization is the best and that the European is a nine days’
wonder.’ (HS, p. 67)
‘This
civilization is such that one has only to be patient and it will be
self-destroyed.’ (HS, p. 30)
Although the
foregoing analysis provides some understanding of Gandhiji’s
critique of modernity, it is in some important ways quite
incomplete. Gandhiji’s anti-technology views, for instance, cannot
be explained by the foregoing analysis. A priori there seems to be
no reason why meta-normative considerations should have a bearing on
one’s attitude towards technology.
From a close
reading of Hind Swaraj it appears to be the case that Gandhiji’s
anti-technology views emerged essentially from insights that he had
regarding modern technology. One insight based on his observations
and beliefs related to the unintended consequences of modern
technology. Explaining his opposition to railways he says:
‘It must be
manifest to you that, but for the railways, the English could not
have such a hold on India as they have. The railways, too, have
spread the bubonic plague. Without them, the masses could not move
from place to place. They are the carriers of plague germs. Formerly
we had natural segregation. Railways have also increased the
frequency of famines because, owing to facility of means of
locomotion, people sell out their grain and it is sent to the
dearest markets. People become careless and so the pressure of
famine increases. Railways accentuate the evil nature of man. Bad
men fulfill their evil designs with greater rapidity. The holy
places of India have become unholy. Formerly, people went to these
places with very great difficulty. Generally, therefore, only the
real devotees visited such places. Nowadays rogues visit them in
order to practise their roguery.’
Although I have
not been able to find anything in Hind Swaraj to substantiate it, it
is probable that at an intuitive level Gandhiji perceived some kind
of organic relationship between technology and values. For the
purpose of linking Gandhiji’s views regarding technology with the
meta-normative considerations it would suffice if it is accepted
that given a particular technological structure not every
value-system can be supported by it; and given a value-system not
every technology can coexist with it. Given this kind of organic
relationship between technology and values, one is bound to take an
anti-modern technology stand if one comes to believe that the
value-system that one would like to have in the society cannot
co-exist with it.
Gandhiji was also
aware of an organic relationship between technology and the products
which became possible because of it. From this perspective also he,
unlike most of his contemporaries, was not enamoured of modern
technology. Writing in Harijan on polished versus unpolished rice he
says:
In my writing
on cent per cent swadeshi, I have shown how some aspects of it can
be tackled immediately with benefit to the starving millions both
economically and hygienically. The richest in the land can share the
benefit. Thus if rice can be pounded in the villages after the old
fashion, the wages will fill the pockets of the rice-pounding
sisters and the rice-eating millions will get some sustenance from
the unpolished rice instead of pure starch which the polished rice
provides. Human greed, which takes no count of the health or the
wealth of the people who come under its heels, is responsible for
the hideous rice-mills one sees in all the rice-producing tracts. If
public opinion was strong, it would make rice-mills an impossibility
by simply insisting on unpolished rice and appealing to the owners
of rice-mills to stop a traffic that undermines the health of a
whole nation and robs the poor people of an honest means of
livelihood. But who will listen to the testimony of a mere layman on
the question of food values? I, therefore, give below an extract
from The Newer Knowledge of Nutrition by Mr. Collum and Simmonds
which a medical friend, to whom I had appealed for help, has sent
with his approbation.5
In Hind Swaraj he
says:6
Civilization
seeks to increase bodily comforts, and it fails miserably even in
doing so.
If one accepts the
foregoing way of interpreting Gandhian critique of modernity then a
substantial part of Hind Swaraj can be understood in a unified
framework. In Hind Swaraj in several places Gandhiji argues in terms
of some absolute principle or the other, but then elsewhere in a
different context he would not apply that principle in an absolute
way. Take for instance the following passage regarding doctors:7
‘Doctors have
almost unhinged us. Sometimes I think that quacks are better than
highly qualified doctors. Let us consider: the business of a doctor
is to take care of the body, or, properly speaking, not even that.
Their business is really to rid the body of diseases that may
afflict it. How do these diseases arise? Surely by our negligence or
indulgence. I overeat, I have indigestion. I go to a doctor, he
gives me medicine, I am cured. I overeat again, I take his pills
again. Had I not taken the pills in the first instance, I would have
suffered the punishments deserved by me and I would not have
overeaten again. The doctor intervened and helped me to indulge
myself. My body thereby certainly felt more at ease; but my mind
became weakened. A continuance of a course of medicine must,
therefore, result in loss of control over the mind.’
Here Gandhiji is
spelling out an argument which is against all medicine, not merely
modern medicine. The existence of medicine will almost surely lead
to self-indulgence with its inevitable consequences. Similarly, in
the passage quoted earlier regarding lawyers there appears to be a
general argument which is applicable to the institution of lawyers
generally. But in Hind Swaraj he says:8
‘This nation
had courts, lawyers and doctors, but they were all within bounds.’
The only way that
these statements could be reconciled is by invoking the idea of a
meta-normative principle which will determine the domains and
sub-domains of values; and by postulating that the Gandhian critique
of modernity is not so much about the presence or absence of this or
that value but pertains to the rejection of the meta-normative
principle embodied in the modern civilization.
To sum up:
Gandhiji saw values interwoven in every feature of the society,
whether it was technology, institutions or the consumption pattern.
For Gandhiji, the normative structure of the society was of
paramount importance. He was critical of everything which he thought
might be inimical to the value-system which he believed in and
considered superior to other value-systems. In all likelihood his
opposition to modern technology stemmed from his intuitive feeling
that the value-system that he believed in was not compatible with
modern technology. His disapproval of most Western institutions also
had its roots in his understanding that the nature of these
institutions was such that they were bound to lead to a value-system
which was inconsistent with the value system he found appropriate.
His critique of modernity is non-trivial as implicit in it is the
idea of non-sustainability of a social order which places hedonistic
values on the highest pedestal. In according centrality to the
normative structure of the society Gandhiji stands apart from his
contemporaries who accorded centrality to science or science-based
technology.
References:
-
Gandhi,
Mohandas K., Indian Home Rule or Hind Swaraj, Navajivan
Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 1938; Translation of ‘Hind Swaraj’,
published in the Gujarat columns of Indian Opinion, 11th and
18th December, 1909; Published by Yann FORGET on 20th July 2003,
with LATEX 2"; (Hereinafter referred to as HS); p. 15.
-
HS, p. 45.
-
One could also
ask questions regarding other kinds of sustainability,
ecological sustainability being one of the most important. If a
society is ecologically unsustainable then it must necessarily
be normatively unsustainable. The converse, however, need not
hold. Similar entailment relations hold between normative
sustainability and other kinds of sustainability. Thus the
normative sustainability, the focus of discussion here,
guarantees other kinds of sustainability.
-
Speaking of
modern civilization he says (HS, p. 29): Let us first
consider what state of things is described by the word
‘civilization’. Its true test lies in the fact that people
living in it make bodily welfare the object of life.
-
Harijan,
26-10-1934
-
HS, p. 30
-
HS, p. 43
-
HS, p.46
*Centre for Economic Studies and
Planning, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University,
New Delhi 110067
Email:
satish.k.jain@gmail.com |